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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FEDERAL CORPORATION TAX.

D

URING the special session of Congress held the past summer
there was enacted as an amendment to the new Tariff Law
what is generally known as the Federal Corporation Tax.' At
the time of its consideration in Congress and since its enactment
there has been considerable discussion regarding the constitutionality of the measure, and no little doubt has been expressed as to its
validity. The Act, so far as is necessary to its understanding, is
as follows:
"Every corporation, joint stock company or association, organized for profit and having a capital stock represented by
shares, * * * shall be subject to pay annually a special excise
tax with respect to the carrying on or doing business by such
corporation, joint stock company or association, * * * equivalent to one per centum upon the entire net income over and above
five thousand dollars received by it from all sources during
such year, exclusive of amounts received by it as dividends
upon stock of other corporations, joint stock companies or associations, * * * subject to the tax hereby imposed," etc.
The events and circumstances leading up to the enactment of this
provision make an interesting bit of legislative and political history.
Perhaps no- decision of the Supreme Court, unless it be that in the
Dred Scott case, has evoked so much criticism generally as Pollock
2
v. Parmers Loan and Trust Co., the income tax case. Ever since
the decision of that case it has been the wish of a great many lawyers that the question might be again presented to the court. When,
therefore, it became evident that Congress would have to devise
some means of increasing the national revenues, it was suggested
that an income tax measure be again enacted. The proposition met
with considerable opposition on one score or another, and on June
16, 19o9, President Taft ina special message to Congress suggested
that inasmuch as the Supreme Court had held an income tax of the
nature proposed invalid without apportionment among the several
states, the wiser plan would be for Congress to propose an amendment to the Constitution, and recommended as a substitute, for the
present at least, the enactment of a law imposing upon all corpora:H. R. 1438, §38.

.157;

U. S. 429, 158 U. S. 6oz.

s C. R., Vol. 44, PP. 3450, 345x.
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ions and joint stock companies organized for profit, with certain exceptions, an excise measured by two per cent on the net income of
such corporations and companies. From this it would seem that the
purpose of the act was revenue. That, however, was not all.
The ever growing evils of corporate organization and management had given rise to a demand for some sort of federal control or
regulation. Such control, however, as to corporations generally,
'could be exercised only as an incident to or by virtue of some recognized power granted to the National Government, for there is found
in the Constitution no express power vested in the United States to
regulate or control corporations in general. In this scheme of corporate taxation was found a method of getting at such control.. As
said by President Taft in his message recommending the measure,
"Another merit of this tax is the federal supervision which must be
exercised in order to make the law effective over the annual-accounts
and business transactions of all corporations. While the faculty of
assuming a corporate form has been of the utmost utility in the business world, it is also true that substantially all of the abuses and all
of the evils which have aroused the public to the necessity of reform were made possible by the use of this very faculty. If now,
by a perfectly legitimate and effective system of taxation, we are incidently able to possess the Government and the stockholders and the
public of the knowledge of the real business transactions and the
gains and profits of every corporation in the country, we have made
a long step toward that supervisory control of corporations which
may prevent a further abuse of power." But however desirable federal control may be deemed to be, the provision must stand or fall
upon its validity as a tax or revenue measure.
The main legal objections to the tax may be summed up in general as follows:
(i) The tax is of such a nature that under the Constitution and
decisions of the. Supreme Court it can be levied by Congress, if at
all, only by apportionment among the states.
(2) Congress may not interfere with or hamper a state in its
exercise of sovereign powers not delegated to the United States;
the creation of corporations is an incident of sovereignty; the tax is
therefore invalid because it interferes with the power of the states
to create corporations.
(3) The tax is unconstitutional because it is not uniform, the
Constitution requiring that "all duties, imposts and excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States."
i. Whether the first objection, as to the necessity of apportion-
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ment, is tenable depends upon the nature of the tax imposed. The
Constitution provides for four sorts of taxation, viz., duties, imposts,
excises and taxes, and the latter are either direct or indirect It is
perhaps needless to say that the act provides for neither a duty nor
an impost in the generally accepted meaning of those terms.- It is,
then, either an excise or a tax. In determining whether apportionment is essential it is necessary to consider only whether it provides
for a direct tax, for only direct taxes are required to be apportioned.
4
In the early case of Hylton.'v. United States, it was expressed as
the opinion of the Justices that the only taxes included -under the
head of "direct taxes" as used in the Constitution were taxes levied
on land and capitation taxes, but the point was not necessary to the
decision of the case. In a number of cases subsequent thereto this
view was declared by the Supreme Court. But in the case of Pallock v. FarinersLoanit and Trust Co., it was determined that in addi-.
tion to the sorts of taxation conceded in the Hylton case to be direct
taxes, burdens in the nature of taxation placed upon income from
real estate and invested personalty were within the constitutional
inhibition of direct taxes without. apportionment. The Pollock case
has, never been overruled, and still stands as the law. The extent to
which the Supreme Court has gone in determining what taxes are
direct may be summed up, then, as follows: Capitation taxes and
taxes imposed upon a person because of his general ownership of
real or personal property or imposed on the income derived from
such realty or invested personal property are direct and must be apportioned.
Is this corporation tax a direct tax or is it an excise? On this
point the phraseology of the act is of great importance. It provides
that corporations, etc., "shall be subject to pay annually a special excise tax with respect to the carrying on or doing business of such
corporation, * * * equivalent to one per centum upon the entire net
income over and above," etc. Manifestly this purports to be a tax
upon the business and not upon the inwoine as such, though it is true
that the amount of the tax is to be measured by the amount of income. In 1898 Congress passed an act providing "That every person, firm, corporation, or company carrying on or doing the business
of refining petroleum, or refining sugar, or owning or controlling
any pipe line for transporting oil or 6ther products, whose gross
anmtal receipts exceed two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, shall
be subject to pay annually a special excise tax equivalent t6 one
63 DaHt. 171.
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quarter of one per centum on the gross amount of all receipts," etc.3
The Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. resisted the payment of the tax,
and the question was finally determined in the case of Spreckels Sug6
ar Refining Co. v. McClahh the Court holding that the-tax imposed
was valid and constitutional. It was contended on behalf of the Refining Co. that the act provided for a direct tax. The court, by Mr.
Justice HARLAN, on page 411, said:
"* * * Clearly the tax is not imposed upon gross annual receipts
as property, but only in respect of the carrying on or doing the business of refining sugar. It cannot be otherwise regarded because of
the fact that the amount of the tax is measured by the amount of the
gross annual receipts. The tax is defined in the act as 'a special
excise tax,' and, therefore, it must be assumed, for what it is worth,
that Congress had no purpose to exceed its powers under the Constitution, but only to exercise the authority granted to it of laying
and collecting excises." This case is very persuasive upon this point,
act of 1898 and
for the corporation tax act was modeled upon the
7
the language of Mr. Justice HARLAN, just quoted.
It may be suggested that the Act in question does not impose a
tax on business, since no particular businesses are named and it applies only to corporations. Had the act applied to persons, firms
and corporations and specified in detail every conceivable form of
business, it would seem under the decision in the Spreckels case that
it would be clearly a tax on business as such. Surely the fact that
Congress expressed the provision in blanket form instead of specifying the various sorts of businesses ought not to make the measure any
the less a tax on business. As will be pointed out hereafter there is
no legal objection to Congress classing corporations together as ihe
objects of the tax. But whether it is a tax on business or a tax on
the privilege of doing business in a corporate capacity makes no difference, it is believed. If it is a tax on the privilege necessarily it is
an excise and not a direct tax.
Businesses aid the privilege of existing and operating in a corporate capacity must at this time be conceded proper subjects of
taxation. "Everything to which the legislative power extends may
be the subject of taxation, whether it be person or property, or possession, franchise or privilege, or occupation or right.", "It has
been seen that the sovereignty may, in the discretion of its legisla'Revenue
'1

Act of 1898, §27.

92 U. S. 397.

See C. R., Vol. 44, P. 4087 et seq.
s Cooley on Taxation, p. 9.
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ture, levy a tax on every species of property within its jurisdiction.
* * * And what is true of property is true of privileges and occupations also; the state may tax all, or it may select for taxation certain classes and leave the others untaxed. Considerations of general
policy determine what the selection shall be in such cases, and there
is no restriction on the power of choice unless one is imposed by
°
constitution."9 In the License Tax cases" the Supreme Court upheld taxes imposed upon certain businesses, not because anything in
their nature gave Congress authority to levy the taxes, but on the
broad power of taxation vested by the Constitution in Congress. In
the Spreckels case it was a business that was taxed,; the tax was
upheld, but not because of the nature of the business of refining
sugar.. In Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule" the court said: "The tax*ing power (of the United States) is given in the most comprehensive terms. The only limitations imposed are: That direct taxes,
including the capitation tax, shall be apportioned; that duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform, and that no duties shall be im'posed upon articles exported from any state. With these exceptions,
the exercise of the power is in all respects unfettered." And in
12
Knowlton v. Moore the following- language was used by the court:
"It is not denied that, subject to a compliance with the limitations in
the Constitution, the taxing power of Congress exends to all usual
objects of taxation. Indeed, as said in the License Tar cases, 5 Wall.
462, 471, after referring to the limitations expressed in the Constitution, 'Thus limited, and thus only, it (the taxing power of Congress) reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion'."
There is another limitation upon the taxing power of Congress which
is not referred to in the above quoted cases, the one suggested by
the second objection to the validity of the tax under discussion, and
will therefore be more appropriately considered under that head.
With these limitations and qualifications, then, the taxing power of
Congress is concurrent with that of the states. Indeed in Lane County v. Oregon 3 the court went further than this, saying that "It (the
power of taxation) is indeed a concurrent power, and in the case of
a tax on the same subject by both governments, the claim of the
9 Cooley on Taxation, p. 1o94.
10 5

WalL 462.

117 wa.L 433. In this case the Supreme Coitrt upheld a tax levied by Congress
upon the "amounts insured, renewed, or continued by insurance companies upon the
gross amounts of premiums received, and assessments made by them, and also upon
dividends, undistributed sums, and income."
12 1 7 8 U.

S. 41.

's7 Wall. 71.

THE FEDERAL CORPORATION TAX

United States, as the supreme authority, must be preferred; but with
this qualification it (the power of the states) is absolute."
Another argument which may appropriately be discussed under
this first head has been advanced against the validity of the measure.
In short it is this: There are or may be corporations whose business
is made up entirely of owning, using and deriving profits from real
estate, a tax upon which corporations would come squarely within
the sort of taxation interdicted by the Supreme Court in the income
tax case; and the opinion of Mr. Justice HARLAN in the Spreckels
14
On the surface this
case is cited as supporting the argument.
point is one of the strongest against the act; but its fallacy lies in the
failure to distinguish between a tax on income from-real estate as
such and a tax on business or frapchise measured by the amount
of income. While it is true that the nature of the business is different, the owning, using and deriving the profits from real, estate is as much a business as is the refining of oil or sugar, or the
transportation of oil by means of pipe lines. By taking certain isolated extracts from the opinion in the Spreckels case material may
be found in apparent support of the argument, but when read in
connection with the context and with reference to the points under
consideration it is at once seen that the opinion lends no support to
the view. In that case the act in question provided for a tax on
persons, etc., engaged in the business of refining sugar, etc. It appeared from the evidence that part of the receipts of the Spreckels
Sugar Refining Co. was made up of money received by the company
as wharfage for the use of certain wharves owned by it, and the
point involved was whether the receipts from that source could properly be considered as receipts in the company's business as a refiner
of sugar. In the light of the facts, then, the following language of
Mr. Justice HARLAN lends no support or countenance to the argument:
"It was hi proof that the plaintiff owned three wharves on
the Delaware river, at which vessels landed, and for the use of
which those vessels paid wharfage according to the rates prescribed by a general tariff. * * * The wharves were built by
the plaintiff for the purpose of transacting any business that it
might have or for which it saw fit to use them. And nearly all
the business done at that time at the wharves was the unloading
of sugar consigned to the plaintiff. * * * In other words,
were the receipts from wharfage properly included in plaintiff's
14See

C. R., Vol. 44, P. 4092.
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gross annual receipts upon which the amount of the prescribed
tax, was to be computed?
"This question is not wholly free from difficulty. But we
think the better reason is 'with the ruling in the Circuit Court
and in the Circuit Court of Appeals, to the effect that the
wharves, in every substantial sense, constituted a part of the
plaintiff's 'plant,' and, if not absolutely necessary, were of great
value, in the prosecution of its business, and that receipts derived by plaintiff from the use of the wharves by vessels-particularly because, with rare exceptions, the vessels using them
brought to the plaintiff the raw sugar which it refined-were
receipts in its business of refining sugar."
It is thus apparent that the only point under consideration and the
only thing deternjined by the above quoted language was that receipts from such sources were receipts in the company's business of
refining sugar, receipts from the business being the only measure of
the tax provided by the' act. So instead of being an authority
against the validity of the corporation tax it is in its favor; for if
the tax is considered as imposed, on business, the case is squarely in
point on the proposition that receipts from real estate are properly
included in determi*ning the net income of the corporation.
Professor Goodnow has taken the position that the act is unconstitutional in so far as it includes income derived from property, on
the ground that under the income tax decision such tax would have
to be apportioned.15 Just how he arrives at that conclusion does not
appear. In another part of his 'article he takes the view that the tax
is really upon the franchise or privilege. If he is correct in that,
riecessarily the tax must be an excise, no matter how its amount is
measured: And if the tax be considered as imposed on business, it is
equally an excise. In neither case need it be apportioned.
2. Is the tax such an interference with the sovereignty of the
states that it is invalid on that ground? Section 8 of Article I of the
Constitution provides that Congress shall have "power to lay and
collect taxes, duties, imposts and bxcises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United
States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."
Except as to the federal government each state is sovereign.
In the founding of our scheme of government the people saw
Article on "The Constitutionality of the Federal Corporation Tax."
Law Review, December, x9o9.

Columbia
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fit to deprive the several states of certain portions and attributes of their sovereignty, and conferred them upon the nation.
As to the powers, then, granted to the United States it is supreme,
and Section 2 of Article VI of the Constitution so provides. Such
powers are unlimited except as qualified by the Constitution or the
amendments thereto or in certain cases by implications growing out
of the nature of our system of dual government. Those powers and
tights which are conferred upon the federal government and which
in their nature admit of control by but the one branch of the government, the sovereignty of the states does not and cannot limit. Examples of this are found in the power to regulate interstate commerce and the right to coin money. Though these matters are incidents of sovereignty, the states are deprived of their exercise because the people have delegated control over them to Congress. But
upon the taxing power of the United States there is a limitation inherent in the nature of the dual system. The power to tax, as to
the general subjects of taxation, is not exclusive. The power, therefore, as to the Federal Government, is impliedly limited to the extent that the United States cannot so exercise its taxing power as
to prevent a state from discharging the ordinary functions of government. In Gibbon.s v. Ogden18 Chief Justice MARsHAi,, said:
"Taxation is the simple operation of taking small portions
from a perpetually accumulating mass, susceptible of almost infinite division; and a power in one to take what is necessary
for certain purposes is not, in its nature, incompatible with-a
power in another to take what is necessary for other purposes.
* * * When, then, each government exercises the power of
taxation, neither is exercising the power Qf the other. But,
when a state proceeds to regulate commerce with foreign nations or among the several States, it is exercising the very
power that is granted to Congress, and is doing the very thing
which Congress is authorized to do. There is no analogy, then,
between the power of taxation and the power of regulating
commerce. * * * It has been contended by the counsel for appellant, that as the word to 'regulate' implies in its nature full
power over the thing to be regulated, it excludes, necessarily,
the action of all others that would perform the same operation
on the same thing."
17
And in Soutlt Carolinav. United States Mr. Justice BRnwR in
delivering the opinion of the court said:
199 Wheat. 1.
7199 U. S. 437.
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"It will be seen that the only qualifications of the absolute,
untrammeled power to lay and collect excises are that they shall
be for public purposes, and that they shall be uniform throughout the United States. All other limitations named in the Constitution relate to taxes, duties and imposts. * * *
"But it is undoubtedly true that that which is implied is as
much a part of the Constitution as that which is expressed. ***
"Among those matters which are inplied, though not expressed, is that the nation may not, in the exercise of itspowers,
prevent a State from discharging the ordinary functions of government, just as it follows from the second clause of Article
VI. of the Constitution, that no State can interfere with the
free ap.d unembarrassed exercise by the National Government
. of all the powers conferred upon it."
Having thus considered the nature of the taxing power of Congress and marked out in a general way the limitations thereon, we
are brought to the supposedly most perplexing question in the entire
matter, namely, whether the imposition of the tax is such an interference with the sovereignty of the states as to render the provision
invalid. -It may be admitted, at the start, that the power to grant
articles of incorporation is an incident of general .sovereignty; and,
further, it may probably be conceded that it would not be competent
for Congress, under, the taxing power, to place a burden directly
upon the action of the states in creating corporations. There is a
clear distinction, however, between a tax on the creation of corporations and an excise imposed on corporations for the privilege of existing and operating as such or on the busifiesses in which corporations may engage. There is also a clear distinction between a tax
on the business and a tax on the privilege. As pointed out, manifestly Congress intended the measure to be a tax on business, and
if it is so considered, the authorities herein referred to are practically.
conclusive to the effect that the tax is valid. Moreover, should the
view of the court be that the act provides for an excise on-the privilege, it is believed that the authorities are equally conclusive to the
same effect.
18
The. case of Veazie Bank v. Fenno is frequently cited on this
as authority for the valsovereignty
point of interference with state
idity of the act under consideration. That case, however, when closely analyzed does -not stand as authority for the pr6position to which
it is cited. The court was very careful to state that the object of
the tax was "not the franchise of the bank, but property created, or
18

WalL _533.
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contracts made and issued under the franchise, or power to issue
bank bills." The decision might well have been based entirely upon
other grounds. On page 549 the Chief Justice said:
"Having thus, in the exercise of undisputed constitutional
powers, undertaken to provide a currency for the whole country,
it cannot be questioned that Congress may, constitutionally, secure the benefit of it to the people by appropriate legislation.
To this end, Congress has denied the quality of legal tender to
foreign coins, and has provided by law against the imposition
of counterfeit and base coin on the community. To the same
end, Congress may restrain, by suitable enactments, the circulation as money of any notes not issued under its own authority.
Without this powr, indeed, its attempts to secure a sound and
uniform currency for the country must be futile.
"Viewed in this light, as well as in the other light of a duty
on contracts or property, we cannot doubt the constitutionality
of the tax under consideration."
In the Spreckels case, before referred to, it will be remembered
Congress imposed an excise tax upon all persons, firms, corporations
and companies engaged in certain occupations, the tax to be measured by the amount of the gross annual receipts. There was nothing in the nature of the businesses taxed which gave the federal authorities jurisdiction over them; it seemed to be assumed without
question, once it was determined that the imposition was a tax upon
the business as distinguished from a direct tax, that Congress had
power to compel not only persons apd firms to pay the excise, but
corporations and companies as well. Now the Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. was a corporation organized under and by virtue of the
laws of Pennsylvania, and if -a tax on the business of corporations
is an interference with the sovereignty of the states creating them,
it is indeed strange that the point was not made in that case. Of
course it is not.meant that the failure to notice the point is at all
conclusive, but it is at least highly significant.
Perhaps the strongest case that may be cited on this point is South
Carolina v. United States,19 decided by the Supreme Court as recently as 1905. The importance of the case is such that a somewhat
detailed examination of it may be warranted. By several statutes,
the State of South Carolina established dispensaries for the wholesale and retail sale of liquor, and prohibited sale by other than the
dispensers. These dispensers received no profit from the sales and
"

99 U. S. 437.
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acted solely in the capacity of agents of the state. The action was
commenced by starting suit in the Court of Claims for the recovery
of the amounts paid by the state for licenses.' Froi a judgment
entered for the United States the state appealed. It was contended
6n the part of the appellant that the tax was imposed upon the state
or its agents and thus interfered directly with its governmental functions; that there being no constitutional limitation as to the amount of
the license tax, and the power to tax being the power to destroy,
if Congress can enforce such a tax againsf a state, it may destroy
this effort of the state in the exercise of its police power to contpol
the sale of liquor. And further that the regulation of the sale of
liquor comes within-the scope of the police power which is in its
fullest extent reserved to the states, and is not subject to national
supervision; but if Congress may tax the agents of the state charged
with the duty of selling intoxicating liquors, it in effect assumes-a
certain control over the police power, and thus may embarrass and
even thwart the attempt of the state to carry out this mode of regulation. In spite of the force of this argument the court held that the
tax was properly leviable upon the dispensers. Here is a case in
which it was held that Congress .may impose a tax upon the privilege of a sovereign state of engaging in the sale of intoxicating
liquors, a measure held to have been a proper exercise of the state's
police power, and a business competent for the state to engage in.20
If this vas not an interference with the sovereignty of the state of
South Carolina, how can it be reasonably argued that a tax upon
either the business or franchise of a private corporation engaged in
no way in carrying out the state's governmental functions is an im-position inconsistent with the sovereignty of the state creating it?
As is apparent from the following language quoted from the opinion
of the court in South Carolina v. United States, the line between
proper and improper federal taxation must be drawn with reference
to whethei" or not the tax interferes with governmental functions.
On page 459 Mr. Justice BRWR said:
"It is also worthy of remark that the cases in which the invalidity of a Federal tax has been affirmed were those in which
the tax was attempted to be levied upon property belonging to
the State, or one of its municipalities, or was a charge upon the
means and instrumentalities employed by the state, in the dischairge of its ordinary functions as a government.
"In Veazie Bank v. Femno, 8 Wall. 533, in which a national
tax of ten per cent on the amount of notes of any person, state
2*Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co. No. r, z7o U. S. 438.
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bank, or banking association, used for circulation, was sustained,
the court thus stated the limits of the power of national taxation over state agencies (p. 547) :
'It may be admitted that the' reserved rights of the states,
such as the right to pass laws, to give effect to laws through
executive, action, to administer justice through the courts, and
to employ all necessary agencies for legitimate purposes of state
government, are not proper subjects of the taxing power of
Congress'."
Again on page 461:
"These decisions, while not controlling the question before us,
indicate that the thought has been that the exemption of state
agencies and instrumentalities from national taxation is limited
to those which are of a strictly governmental character, and
does not extend to those which are used by the state in the carrying on of an ordinary private business."
That the right to control the devolution of property upon death
is an incident of sovereignty has long been recognized. In no respect has control over this matter been delegated to the Federal
Government, and the right, therefore, remains in the states. Nevertheless it can no longer be seriously disputed that Congress, under
the taxing powver, has the right to lay an excise upon inheritances.
This has been settled by a number of well considered cases., Now
since Congress has such power it may levy a tax o! such an amount
as to totally destroy the right to inherit property, thus diverting
the estates of all decedents from the channels designated by the
state into the coffers of the nation.* What, then, has become of the
power of the states? In the inheritance tax cases it was argued with
great force and persistency that such taxes were imposed upon the
exclusive power of the state to regulate the devolution of property
upon death, and constituted a direct interference with the sovereign
power of the states in reference thereto. In Knowlton v. Moore the
Supreme Court 'disposed of this contention as follows (page 59) :
"But the fallacy which underlies the proposition contended
for is the assumption that the tax on the transmission or receipt of property occasioned by death is imposed on the exclusive power of the state to regulate the devolution of property
upon death. The thing forming the universal subject of tax&tion upon which inheritance and legacy taxes rest is the transmission or receipt, and not the right existing to regulate. * * *
Certainly a tax placed upon an inheritance or legacy diminishes,
to the extent, of the tax, the value of the right to inherit or re-
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ceive, but this is a burden cast upon the recipient and not upon
the power of the state to regulate. This distinction shows the
inapplicability to the case in hand of the statement made by Mr.
Chief Justice MARSHALL in McCilloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316, 431, 'that the power to tax involves the power to destroy.'
This principle is pertinent only when there is no power to tax a
particular subject, and has no relation to a ease where such
right exists."
In many respects the analogy between these inheritance tax cases
and the matter under discussion is indeed striking. The point made
by Mr. Justice WrnTs in the above quoted extract from the opinion
in Knowlton v. Moore would seem to be an almost complete answer
1o the argument that the corporation tax is invalid because it taxes
a matter under the exclusive control of the state. This tax is no
more a burden upon or an interference with the state's power of
control than was the inheritance tax. It is true, if this tax is valid,
that Congress may impose upon corporations such burdens that the
advantages derived from corporate existence would not warrant the
payment of the tax, thus effectually destroying corporations and
making the power of the state ini. that respect an empty one; but
that is practically the same situation met by the Supreme Court in
the Knowtoit case with the reply that the tax was not imposed upon
the sovereign right of the state to regulate or control.
It is also well settled that the police power is reserved in its fullest
extent to the several states. The control of the liquor traffic is conceded to be within the police power. The states may prohibit the
sale of intoxicating liquors entir.ely or permit it under such restrictions as the legislatures may see fit tb prescribe, and when there is
no restriction placed upon the traffic there is an implied permission
that it may be conducted free from all hindrance. Yet Congress may
exact a license fee from all persons engaged in the business, and
carrying the power to its logical extent, may prohibit the business
entirely. 21 Has not the Federal Government, then, directly interfered with a matter conceded to be within the state's police power?22
21See also on this general question, McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, the
Oleomargarine Case.
12n South Carolina v. United States, x99 U. S. 437, 456, the court observed:
"There is something of a conflict between the full power of the nation in respect to
taxation and the exemption of the State from Federal taxation in respect to its property
and a discharge of all its functions. Where and how shall the line between them
be drawn? We have seen that the full power of collecting license taxes is in terms
granted to the National Government with only the limitations of uniformity and the
public benefit. The exemption of the State's property and its functions from Federal
taxation is implied from the dual character of our Federal system and the necessity of
preserving the State in all its efficiency," etc.
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As pointed out in South Carolina v. United States the justification of such taxation lies in the fact that no burden is placed upon
the state's governmental agencies or instrumentalities. According
to that case the test should be,-does the tax hamper or affect, or,
we may say, tend to hamper or affect the state in its governmental
capacity? In a number of cases federal taxation has been declared
23
v.
invalid on that ground. The Collector v€. Day; United States
25
24
AmCo.;
&Trust
Loan
Farmers
v.
Pollock
Company;
Railroad
brosini v. United States.28 If we can imagine a corporation, organized for profit, and having a capital stock represented by shares, the
net income of which, corporation exceeds five thousand. dollars, engaged in any sense in carrying on or assisting the state in the exercise of its governmental functions, we may have such a corporation
as to which the tax provided for would be invalid.
The instances herein cited go to show that a tax imposed by Congress is not necessarily invalid because it affects indirectly powers
recognized as being in a sense exclusively within the jurisdiction of
the state. The same arguments sustain the act irrespective of whether the measure is considered as a tax on business or an excise levied
upon the privilege of doing business as a corporation, for the tax
in either view is not a tax upon the *state or its agents, but upon the
corporation as such.
It appears then that the proper test in determining the validity of
federal taxation on subjects within the state or on subjects in which
the state has some sort of interest or power of control, is whether
the tax interferes with the governmental power of the state or hampers any of its governmental agencies in the exercise of their functions. It seems self evident that private corporations organized
solely for the profit of their members are not endowed with any
portion of the state's governmental power, and are not concerned
in any form with the governmental powers of their parent state.
They are not even agents of the state, as were the South Carolina
dispensers. Tried by this test the conclusion is well nigh irresistible
as far as we have gone, that no matter which view of the nature of
the tax is taken the act is valid.
In this connection it may be interesting to note the cases of Owens27
boro National Bank v. Owensboro, in which the Supreme Court
held a state tax on the franchises of a national bank invalid, and
X Wall. 123.
2 1 7 Wall. 322.
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x87 U. S. I.
21173 U. S. 664.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

California v. Pacific Railroad Co.,2" in which the court declared invalid certain state taxes imposed upon the railroad company's franchises. In the latter case the court observed that the franchises had
been granted by the Federal Government for national purposes and
to subserve ,national ends, and that the corporation had been created
by virtue of the power in Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
These eases, however, may be explained by the nature of the business
or function. for which they were created.
3- We are then brought to a consideration of the final point
namely, whether the act as drawn violates the constitutional provision-requiring all excises to be uniform throughout the United States.
This argument may be disposed of very shortly, for the comparatively recent case of Knowlton v. Moore, before referred to, effectually forecloses all question on that score. The following .extract
from the opinion in that case needs no further comment. On page
105 thle court said:
"Thus it came to pass that although the provisions as to preference bethveen ports and that regarding uniformity of duties,
.imposts aid excises were one in purpose, one in their adoption,
they became separated only in arranging the Constitution for
the purpose of style. The first now stands in the Constitution
as a part of the sixth clause of Section 7 of Article I, and the
other is a part of the first clause of Section 8 of Article I. By
the result then of an analysis of the history of the adoption of
the Constitution it becomes plain that the words 'uniform
throughout the United States' do not signify a4. intrinsic but
simply a geographicaluniformity."
There is no doubt of the geographical uniformity of the corporation tax. There can, therefore, be no question as to its validity on
that point.
RALPH W. AIGLE.R.
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